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# Inside Washington

## USSR Increases 'Spies-in-the-Sky'

By ROBERT S. ALLEN and  
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WASHINGTON—Russia is putting into space an increasing number of camera-equipped satellites to observe U.S. and Red naval bases and other military installations.

Last year, the Soviet launched 32 of these "spy-in-the-sky" satellites as compared to 29 in 1968 and 22 in 1967.

Further, in the latter part of 1969, larger and more durable satellites were orbited. There were at least five of these new models, which stayed up around 12 days as against an average of eight previously.

The longer such observation satellites stay aloft, the fewer are needed.

Strikingly indicative of Russia's increasing use of these "spies-in-the-sky" is the steady rise in their number. When the Kremlin first resorted to them in 1962, five small ones were launched. The next year the number doubled, and it has been going up ever since for a record-high of 32 last year.

However, the U.S. is still deemed ahead in such aerial reconnaissance.

While exact figures are classified, it is authoritatively understood that the number of U.S. observation satellites considerably exceed the Soviet's. Also the devices used by the U.S. are longer lasting and more advanced.

The U.S. has obtained much important military information by this means. Some of it has been of a highly secret and spectacular nature — involving nuclear armaments and installments of both the Soviet and Red China. Their location, size and other details are not only definitely known but have been photo-

graphed.

Last year, Russia, in addition to putting into use a longer lasting "spy-in-the-sky" satellite, also shifted to a new launching site.

Cosmos 313 — as the last new model is listed — was put up from the Plesetsk military space center. The older models were launched from the center at Tyuratam.

From this switch, U.S. authorities deduce two things: That the 12-day satellite is now considered operational and will be the standard type until an improved model is developed; the Plesetsk space center will be increasingly employed for "spy-in-the-sky" operations.

This is significant because this space center has played an important role in the development of the Soviet's fractional orbital bombardment system — FOBS.

The FOBS is a flat trajectory missile capable of circling the globe the long way to hit targets in the U.S., thus avoiding radar installations in Greenland and other strategic points. The FOBS menace was strongly stressed by senators favoring the Safeguard ABM defense system in their successful fight last year to get it approved.

Russia conducted a series of FOBS tests in 1966 firing 11 of these potentially devastating long-range weapons. In 1969, only two were tested. It is assumed this decline was due to technical problems.

U.S. authorities also have evidence the Soviet are experimenting with satellite killers, in which a satellite is put into space and then destroyed by exploding a device near it. Radar has detected fragments of space vehicles, indicating the destruction of a satellite or some other space device.

# Dispute on Soviet Missiles Hampers U.S. Arms Stand

By JOHN W. FINNEY  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 10 —

The Defense Department has injected a complication into preparations for negotiations with the Soviet Union on controlling strategic arms, by arguing that the United States cannot stop developing multiple warheads for missiles unless the Soviet Union limits its antiaircraft defenses.

The new Pentagon condition has generated a controversy in the Administration and the disarmament community that has been carried to the National Security Council and the President's Science Advisory Committee.

The Pentagon's argument, which it concedes is hypothetical,

is that the Soviet Union might "upgrade" its surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles—such as the SA-2, which was used with limited success against American planes over North Vietnam—so that they could knock down the warheads of American intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Therefore, the Pentagon is urging the United States to stop developing and deploying warheads for MIRV's, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, unless the Soviet Union agrees to limit its antiaircraft missiles as well as its antiballistic missiles.

Since the protracted debate over the 1963 treaty to limit nuclear testing have the Pentagon and the disarmament community been so deeply divided over a technical issue affecting arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union. And, just as in 1963, the disarmament community is protesting that the Pentagon is raising a hypothetical "absurdity"—as it was recently described by the renowned physicist Dr. Wolfgang K. H. of Stanford University—to thwart any major move toward an agreement to control arms.

## The Main Issue

Within the disarmament community, mainly academic scientists, the interrelated problem of stopping the development of multiple-warhead missiles and the deployment of missile defense systems is regarded as the main issue determining whether it will be possible to keep the present balance in weaponry. The alternative is for the United States and the Soviet Union to step up their nuclear arms race.

The effect of the Pentagon argument about the "upgrading" of the Soviet surface-to-air missile system into an ABM defense is to interpose still another reason the United States should not enter into a moratorium with the Soviet Union on the testing of multiple warheads. It is one that disarmament specialists find difficult to rebut on strictly hypothetical technical terms.

To many proponents of disarmament, this Pentagon argument is reminiscent of the "big hole" theory that was advanced during the debate over the limited test-ban treaty. The argument eventually helped prevent inclusion of underground tests in the treaty.

The "big hole" theory postulated that it would be possible to muffle the seismic signals by setting off a nuclear device in a large underground cavern. The theory was supported by tests conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission in salt mines in Louisiana, but there always remained the practical question of whether a country would be able to build a sufficiently large underground cavern without being detected.

One reason the "big hole" theory is being recalled is because there is a certain similarity in the cast of characters. The principal proponent of the idea that the Soviet Union could upgrade its antiaircraft defenses is Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of Defense Department research and engineering. As director of the Atomic Energy Commission's Livermore Radiation Laboratory in 1963, he opposed the test-ban treaty as disadvantageous to the United States.

As a disarmament arms-control matters, Dr. Foster has called in Dr. Richard Latter, a

RAND Corporation physicist, who in the early nineteen sixties developed the "big hole" theory with his brother, Dr. Albert Latter.

The Pentagon argument is being advanced when the Nixon Administration is entering a crucial phase in determining its position for the negotiations on limiting strategic arms, which will begin in April in Vienna.

Soviet reaction to the prospect of a mutual moratorium on the testing of multiple warheads was described as apparent indifference during the preliminary arms control talks late last year in Helsinki. So there is considerable doubt in Administration circles over whether there is any point now in advancing such a proposal.

Furthermore, there is a growing belief in the Administration that arms technology has probably advanced to the point that deployment of the multiple warheads cannot be stopped and that the most that can be hoped for from the talks is an agreement limiting either the number or the size of the missiles that each side possesses.

To disarmament specialists, one worrisome implication of the Pentagon "upgrading" argument—and one that could greatly complicate the arms-control talks—is that the United States must continue to develop multiple warheads as a counter to the possibility that the Soviet Union will strengthen its missile defenses with the surface-to-air missile.

## New Cycle Is Feared

This type of argument by the Pentagon, it is feared in disarmament circles, could set off another cycle of the atomic arms race.

Thus, it is said, the Soviet Union, as it sees the Pentagon developing an argument for continued multiple warhead testing as a counter to Soviet development of missile defenses, will become fearful that the United States is developing the capacity to attack first.

With this assessment, the Soviet Union would have little incentive to maintain the present balance and a great incentive to deploy missile-interceptor systems as well as its large SS-9 intercontinental missile, which the Pentagon fears is designed to destroy American land-based strategic missiles.

The underlying fallacy of the "upgrading" argument, in the opinion of many disarmament specialists, is that the Pentagon is engaging in a "worst-case analysis," that it ascribes a capacity to the Soviet Union that it would not

claim for itself.

It was a point made by Dr. Fanoisky, one of the world's leading radar scientists and a consultant to the Pentagon, in a lecture at the University of Chicago last November.

The idea that the SAM missile could be upgraded, he said, is an example of "the degree of absurdity" reached "if one carries conservatism in military affairs viewed in isolation to the extreme." Noting that the Defense Department has stated that it would be technically impossible for the Safeguard antimissile system to provide an effective defense for American cities against Soviet attack, he said: "Clearly, in trying to be con-

servative, our Defense Department is giving the Soviets credit for an incredible performance with a very primitive system which we deny exists for the much more sophisticated devices which we are proposing should be built."

As recounted by Administration officials, the "upgrading" argument first began to emerge last spring and summer as an extensive study was begun into the potential hazards and verification problems of plans to control strategic arms.

In the course of their study, which resulted in what one Administration official describes as "a catalogue of nightmares," the Pentagon advanced the idea that the Soviet Union might convert its extensive force of antiaircraft missiles into a missile-interceptor force, supplementing the Galosh system being deployed around Moscow.

The Soviet Union has more than 8,000 SA-2 missiles, deployed mostly around its cities, and about 900 more advanced SA-5 missiles, deployed in an arc to the northwest. The missiles are roughly comparable to the Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules antiaircraft missiles that the United States developed more than 15 years ago. These are generally regarded now as obsolescent.

Since neither Soviet missile has the range or speed wanted in a weapon specifically designed to intercept warheads, the general assumption in the intelligence community is that their mission is antiaircraft defense. There remains the question of why the Soviet Union is increasing the reemployment of the SA-5 missile when the United States is placing less reliance on its strategic bomber force.

### Thrust of Arguments

In attributing a potential role against warheads for the two Soviet antiaircraft missiles, Pentagon planners relied heavily on these factors:

Because of their relatively small explosive yield, the United States multiple warheads will have to be detonated at a relatively low altitude and they will be slowed as they re-enter the atmosphere. Thus the Soviet missiles, despite their limited speed and range, might be able to intercept the warheads in the upper atmosphere before they were detonated.

Because of their large numbers, the Soviet missiles would be able to loft a significant number of nuclear warheads, probably outnumbering the incoming warheads. With the same lethal range of X-rays given off by a nuclear explosion in the upper atmosphere, the Soviet missiles, despite their lack of accuracy, might be able to destroy a significant number of the incoming warheads.

### Limited Role Foreseen

In Congressional testimony last August, Dr. Foster acknowledged that the Soviet missiles, particularly the SA-2, would have a "limited capability" in a missile-interceptor role. The clear implication, and one reinforced privately by Pentagon officials, was that only a relatively small percentage of the Soviet missiles were expected to succeed in destroying any attacking warhead.

But the Pentagon's "upgrading" argument is based on the assumption—and one challenged by disarmament proponents—that the Soviet Union could obtain the capability for a coordinated attack that would eliminate most of the American land-based and submarine-based missiles.

Thus a retaliatory attack by the United States would involve a relatively small number of missiles, which, unless they were multiplied with multiple

warheads, would have little chance of penetrating Soviet defenses.

The "upgrading" argument is a variation of one that has been going on for nearly a decade about the purpose of the so-called Tallinn Line—a Soviet defense system equipped with SA-5 missiles that originally was centered in the Baltic region and now has been extended into European Russia.

The original theory was that the system was designed as a missile defense. In reaction the United States began developing multiple warheads. But about a year ago the intelligence community concluded that the Tallinn Line was an antiaircraft system.

The first hint that the Defense Department was reviving a potential missile-interceptor role for the Tallinn system as part of the "upgrading" argument came last August when Dr. Foster testified before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee in opposition to proposals for a moratorium on the multiple warheads.

### Difficulty Is Explained

He said he concurred with the view that the Tallinn system was primarily an antiaircraft system but, he continued:

"The difficulty is that we can't prove that it does not have substantial A.B.M. capability. I don't know whether it does or not. I am going on the basis that it could have an A.B.M. capability and for that reason, as much as any other, I believe we must continue with the deployment of our MIRV systems."

Policy planning officials outside the Pentagon who are arbitrating in the controversy report that there is general agreement that hypothetically the Soviet Union could upgrade its SAM missiles into missile interceptors. The crucial differences developed over whether such a step was a practical possibility.

To resolve the controversy, the National Security Council staff and the President's Science Advisory Committee reportedly have established panels to study whether as a practical matter the Soviet missiles could be upgraded and if

so how effective they would be, and whether there could be clandestine "upgrading" without detection by the United States.

One technical weakness of the "upgrading" theory, in the opinion of many disarmament specialists outside the government, is the difficulty of developing a radar and computer network that would link the

thousands of missiles in a coordinated defense.

On this point Dr. Foster told the House subcommittee that the Russians "recently initiated some activity that leads us to believe they are constructing a new, large radar." Pentagon officials suggest that the radar could be used to provide the necessary guidance to the missiles in an interception role.

# Laird Retreats On ABM

## Site Expansion Still Undecided, Secretary Says

By George C. Wilson  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird backed off yesterday from his Saturday statement that the second phase of the ABM defense "will go forward" in the new budget.

Laird told Pentagon reporters that the ABM is still an open question and will be reviewed by the National Security Council before President Nixon makes his decision.

At a coffee session with newsmen, the defense secretary also said the Soviet buildup of SS-9 missiles is forcing him to reassess the American offense.

He indicated that if Russia continues to build up its ICBM force at the present fast rate, the United States, in response, may have to accelerate development of a new bomber and an underwater missile carrier.

### New Cuts Planned

But rather than increase the defense budget by spending a lot of money on new weapons, Laird said his plan for the immediate future is to cut military outlays.

During Pentagon budget cuts he made in his first year, Laird said, "We're still going to reduce defense expenditures in a very substantial way in 1971" so that more of the federal budget can be devoted to such domestic programs as health and education.

"It's most important that we get our defense expenditures in tune with the other priorities that do face the nation" and help control inflation, Laird said.

### Chinese Threat

Here are Laird's comments on those and other points:

ABM—"We are now drawing up and will be prepared to present through the National Security Council procedures the various options which are available under Phase II" of the Safeguard ABM. "We will have a full National Security Council meeting before a presidential decision. The Chinese threat projected through the 1970s is approximately the same" as that projected early this year.

The Pentagon's transcript of Laird's remarks after landing at Andrews Air Force Base on Saturday contains these statements: "Phase II (of the ABM) will go forward in this 1971 budget. There will be funding requested for the Phase II program. The total funding for Phase II probably will not be requested in 1971 budget because Phase I was held up for six months."

See LAIRD, A6, Col. 1

### LAIRD, From AI

Since Laird is still emphasizing the threat from the Soviet SS-9 Scarp missile, the likeliest Phase II options to be funded in the fiscal 1971 budget are a missile defense around Washington, D.C.—a command center—and protection for more than the two Minuteman sites covered by Phase I defensive missiles.

**New Weapons**—If the Soviet missile threat continues to develop and no progress is made at the SALT talks, Laird said the United States will have to consider speeding up the development of a new bomber—the AMSA—and the underwater, long-range missile system—ULMS.

The AMSA (advanced manned strategic aircraft) is still on paper, not in production. The same goes for ULMS.

The Air Force AMSA would succeed the B-52 long-range bomber. It would be able to stand off from a target and fire in nuclear-tipped missiles.

The Navy ULMS in the research stage would be like an underwater barge stuffed with ICBMs. The barge would move its location off the American shore occasionally to make it difficult for Russia to zero in its missiles. Crews would be taken to the barge by submarine, climbing inside ULMS through an airlock.

The general trend in strategic weaponry is to move offensive H-bombs out to sea rather than keeping them on land. The Air Force, however, is resurrecting the old idea of a mobile Minuteman.

Laird yesterday character-

ized a speedup on AMSA and ULMS as "possibilities" and said he did not oppose studying a mobile ICBM.

Philosophically, Laird has been an exponent of dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. He believes the American ABM strengthens President Nixon's hand at the SALT talks and his remarks at yesterday's news conference about new offensive weapons, like AMSA and ULMS, may have been directed in part at the Soviets.

**Defense Spending**—Defense spending in the fourth quarter of the 1968 calendar year was at the annual rate of "about \$85 billion, 9.6 per cent of the Gross National Product." Laird said that by September, 1969, he had brought that spending rate down to \$81 billion, or 8.6 per cent of the GNP.

The spending rate for 1971, he said, will be reduced by "substantially" more than one percentage point of the GNP. Also, he said the Pentagon will take a smaller slice of the total federal budget in Fiscal 1971.

By way of comparison, Laird said that the Pentagon accounted for these percentages of the total federal budget in recent years: 43 per cent in Fiscal 1968, 42.3 per cent in Fiscal 1969, and "it will be down to 39.9 per cent" in Fiscal 1970.

Without giving the specific figures, Laird said in Fiscal 1971 (beginning July 1) the Pentagon slice of the federal budget "will be going down again a substantial percentage level."

# Moscow's Nuclear Threat Grows

## New Intelligence on Soviets' Dread SS-9 Missile System Indicates Laird's Warning Was Conservative

By Rowland Evans  
and Robert Novak

**HARD NEW** intelligence on Soviet construction of SS-9 long-range missile sites not only confirms Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's warning last March against a possible Soviet "first strike" capability but shows he actually underestimated Soviet progress.

When Laird delivered his warning, he was accused of trying to scare Congress about the Soviet missile threat in order to win over wavering senators in support of the U.S. antiballistic missile (ABM) program.

Since then, Soviet construction of the highly accurate SS-9, with its dreaded 25-megaton warhead, has proceeded even faster than the construction estimates on which Laird based his warning. Military experts are convinced that the high degree of accuracy built into the SS-9 system conclusively brands it as a "first-strike" weapon to knock out U.S. retaliatory long-range missiles, thus preventing any U.S. counterattack.

The new estimates of Soviet production of the SS-9 strongly hint that Moscow is doing one of two things: Using this weapon to in-

crease its bargaining power at the arms control talks, the first phase of which ended late last month; or using the arms talks to lull the United States into false hopes while the Soviets radically increase their first-strike capability.

The second of these possibilities worries Pentagon officials more than the first. The Lorelei effect of the arms talks is already obvious. The mere prospect of negotiations fed congressional zeal to cut the new defense budget last month, forcing the Nixon administration to accept new appropriations for strategic weapons a full billion dollars under the amount approved for 1968-1969.

Laird's intimates say he can live with the fears budget-cutting pressures will rise even more this year when the arms con-

trol talks and against the alarming increase in Soviet SS-9s.

### Jets for Taiwan

**BEHIND** the embarrassing public disagreement between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Defense Secretary Laird over F-4 jets for Formosa is a conflict between two of President Nixon's cherished projects: the "Nixon doctrine" for Asia and the hope for better relations between the United States and Red China.

Laird backs the \$54.5 million item for a squadron of F-4 jets, wedged into the foreign aid appropriation bill at the last moment in the House, as a natural step in support of the Nixon doctrine. That doctrine, enunciated by President Nixon in Guam last year, is supposed to phase out U.S. manpower commitments in future confrontations with the Communists just as U.S. troops are being withdrawn now from Vietnam.

In place of American troops, Mr. Nixon pledged generous U.S. military equipment to back U.S. allies in Asia. The last-minute inclusion of the F-4s in the foreign aid bill moves precisely in that direction. For that reason, although the Pentagon never specifically requested the jets, Laird now supports the House and would like to see the \$54.5 million kept in the bill.

But Rogers looks at the jets as a backward step in his efforts to open a serious diplomatic dialogue with Peking. Obviously, the Chinese Communists are appalled by the thought of Nationalist China obtaining a squadron of the latest U.S. combat fighter.

To resolve this intramural dispute, high-level negotiations are under way between State and Defense. The White House said last week that Mr. Nixon backs Rogers, but there still is no common administration front on the touchy issue of the jets.

The deadline is a real one. Inclusion of the jets by the House infuriated the Senate, and particularly Sen. J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Relations Committee, because they were not specifically authorized—leading the Senate

will not get through Congress until Mr. Nixon brings his official family into agreement, in effect a choice between a new opening to Red China or a start for the Nixon doctrine.

With both sides frozen into conflicting positions, the bill

will not get through Congress until Mr. Nixon brings his official family into agreement, in effect a choice between a new opening to Red China or a start for the Nixon doctrine.

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